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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Gregory Louis Kelly appeals from the district court's summary 
dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. 
Statement of Facts and Course of the Underlyin~ Criminal Proceedings (S.Ct. 
Docket No. 30586)' 
Kelly was charged with four counts of conspiracy to traffic in 
methamphetamine, one count of trafficking in methamphetamine, one count 
of possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver when children are 
present, and one count of conspiracy to traffic in marijuana. (30586 R., 
pp.125-129.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Kelly pled guilty to two counts of 
conspiracy to traffic in methamphetamine in exchange for the state's 
dismissal of the other five counts. (30586 R., pp.144-152.) The district court 
entered judgment and imposed concurrent unified sentences of twelve years 
with eight years fixed. (30586 R., pp.169-172.) Kelly's Rule 35 motion was 
denied. (30586 R., pp.189-196, 206.) Kelly timely appealed from the 
judgment of conviction and sentence. (30586 R., pp.183-188.) 
On direct appeal, the ldaho Court of Appeals affirmed Kelly's sentence. 
State v. Kelly, 2005 Opinion No. 307 (Ct. App. January 5, 2005) 
(unpublished). The remittitur was issued on January 27, 2005. (Court file, 
S.Ct. No. 30586, Remittitur, dated 1/27/05.) 
' The state is, contemporaneously with the filing of this brief, filing a motion 
requesting that the ldaho Supreme Court take Judicial Notice of the clerk's 
record and transcripts in Kelly's prior appeal, State v. Kelly, S.Ct. No. 30586. 
Course of Post-Conviction Proceedinas (S.Ct. Docket No. 33773) 
Kelly filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction relief (33773 R., 
pp.4-24; attached as Appendix A), as well as an unsigned, unverified 
document entitled "Brief and Affidavit in Support of Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief' (33773 Exhibit). The state filed an answer, asserting as an 
affirmative defense that Kelly's petition was untimely. (33773 R., pp.34-36.) 
Kelly responded by first providing the court with a copy of his notice of appeal 
(33773 R., pp.37-44), and then with a copy of the remittitur issued in his direct 
appeal (33773 R., pp.46-55), establishing that his petition for post-conviction 
for relief was timely filed. 
The state then filed a motion for summary dismissal on the basis that 
Kelly "has no evidentiary basis to support his claims" and "therefore no 
genuine issue of material fact exists." (33773 R., pp.60-61.) The state's 
memorandum in support of its motion more fully laid out the grounds meriting 
summary disposition. (33773 Exhibit; attached as Appendix B.) On August 
30, 2006, the district court scheduled a hearing for September 27, 2006. 
(33773 R., p.2.) On September 25, the district court received Kelly's 
response to the state's motion which consisted of additional argument as well 
as another affidavit. (33773 R., pp.63-68; attached as Appendix C.) 
On September 27, 2006, the district court held the hearing on the 
state's motion for summary dismissal, noting that it had received Kelly's 
written response to the motion but had not received any notice from Kelly that 
he wished to participate. (33773 R., p.69; Tr., p.4, Ls.6-15.) In Kelly's 
absence, the state simply noted that it had outlined the reasons for its motion 
in its brief, and submitted the issue on its briefs. (Tr., p.4, L.24 - p.5, L.8.) 
The district court took notice of the proceedings in the underlying case and 
indicated it would take the matter under advisement. (33773 R., p.69; Tr., 
p.5, L.9-p.6, L.4.) 
Two days after the hearing, the district court received Kelly's motion for 
transport to allow him to be present at the hearing. (33773 R., pp.71-72.) 
The district court thereafter issued its Memorandum Decision and Order, in 
which it granted the state's motion for summary dismissal. (33773 R., pp.73- 
87; attached as Appendix D.) Kelly timely appealed from the district court's 
order. (33773 R., pp.97-102.) 
ISSUES 
Due to their length, the issues enumerated by Kelly are not reproduced 
here, but can be found on pages 4 and 5 of the Appellant's brief. The state 
wishes to rephrase the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Kelly failed to establish that he received inadequate notice of the 
grounds for dismissal of his claims? 
2. Has Kelly failed to meet his burden on appeal of demonstrating that the 
district court erred in summarily dismissing his petition? 
3. At the hearing on its motion to dismiss, the state submitted the issue 
on the briefs and presented no additional argument and the court took 
the matter under advisement. Has Kelly failed to demonstrate that his 




Kellv Received Adeauate Notice Of The Grounds For Summary Dismissal 
A. Introduction 
Kelly claims the district court's order for summary dismissal of his 
petition should be remanded because, he claims, the state's notice did not 
provide adequate notice of the grounds for dismissal or, if it did, the district 
court dismissed his petition on grounds other than those in the state's notice. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.5-13.) Because the state's motion and brief in support of 
its motion gave Kelly adequate notice of the district court's eventual grounds 
for dismissal, Kelly has failed to establish reversible error. 
B. Standards Of Law Governing Adequacy Of Notice Of The Grounds For 
Summarv Dismissal 
ldaho Code (i 19-4906 authorizes a district court to summarily dismiss 
a post-conviction petition upon motion by a party or on the court's own 
initiative. Follinus v. State, 127 ldaho.897, 899, 908 P.2d 590, 592 (Ct. App. 
1995). "When the court considering the petition for post-conviction relief is 
conternplating dismissal sua sponte, it must notify the parties of its intention to 
dismiss and must provide its reasons for the potential dismissal." Banks v. 
State, 123 ldaho 953, 954, 855 P.2d 38, 39 (1993). When the state files a 
motion for summary dismissal, setting forth adequate notice of the grounds 
for dismissal, and the court grants the state's motion for the reasons urged by 
the state, a post-conviction petitioner receives adequate notice of the grounds 
for dismissal. Baruth v. Gardner, 110 ldaho 156, 159, 715 P.2d 369, 372 (Ct. 
App. 1986). 
Notice is not sufficient if it merely reiterates the language of the 
UPCPA and contends the post-conviction petitioner is not entitled to relief. 
Banks, 123 ldaho at 954, 855 P.2d at 39. Rather, the notice must "identify 
with ... particularity why the district court deemed [petitioner's] evidence or 
legal theories to be deficient." Downing v. State, 132 ldaho 861, 864, 979 
P.2d 1219, 1222 (Ct. App. 1999). The notice must give the UPCPA petitioner 
a meaningful opportunity to provide further legal authority or evidence that 
may demonstrate the existence of a genuine factual issue. Martinez v. State, 
126 ldaho 813, 818,892 P.2d 488,493 (Ct. App. 1995). 
C. Kellv Received Adequate Notice Of The Grounds For Summary 
Dismissal 
In its motion for summary dismissal the state set forth the law 
applicable to Kelly's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, due process 
violations, violation of his right against self-incrimination and prosecutorial 
misconduct. (33773 Exhibit, pp.2-4.) The state then dealt with whether 
Kelly's claims met those legal requirements or the requirement that each 
claim be substantiated by admissible, factual allegations. (33773 Exhibit, 
pp.4-7.) As the state correctly asserts throughout, none of Kelly's claims 
meet the requirements for post-conviction relief because his allegations 
afforded him no relief, were refuted by the record of the proceedings in the 
criminal case, or were not supported by any admissible evidence, only 
unsubstantiated conclusory allegations and unsworn statements. (33773 
Exhibit, pp.4-7.) For example, the state pointed out for Kelly that he had 
failed to provide any admissible evidence as to what his desired experts could 
have discovered or would have testified to. (33773 Exhibit, p.5.) The state 
pointed out that the record established that Kelly had, in fact, been given the 
opportunity to review his PSI and that counsel had made corrections to the 
PSI on his behalf. (Id.) The state pointed out that the record established that 
Kelly's plea had been voluntarily and intelligently given, including that he had 
been advised of the consequences of his pleas. (33773 Exhibit, p.6.) 
Much of Kelly's argument on appeal rests on is claim that some of the 
legal conclusions in the state's memorandum are incorrect. Whether every 
ground included in the state's memorandum is beyond argument is not, 
however, the standard. Kelly was given notice of the grounds on which his 
petition was ultimately dismissed. 
Despite Kelly's contrary assertion, the district court dismissed his 
petition upon the same grounds advanced by the state. The district court 
indeed acknowledged the state's reasoning for seeking summary dismissal. 
(33773 R., p.77.) The court agreed with the state and determined that 
because the record affirmatively disproved several of Kelly's allegations 
(including the voluntariness of his plea), several of Kelly's complaints went to 
counsel's trial tactics and strategy, and because Kelly provided no evidence 
in support of his claims beyond conclusory allegations and unsworn 
statements, summary dismissal of his petition was appropriate. (33773 R., 
pp.-83.) Although the court apparently also analyzed Kelly's petition under 
additional theories, the court did agree with and dismissed the petition on the 
state's cited grounds in addition to the district court's alternate grounds. As 
such, Kelly had notice of the grounds for summary dismissal of his claims. 
II. 
Kellv Has Failed To Meet His Burden On Appeal Of Demonstrating That The 
District Court Erred In Summarilv Dismissina His Petition 
A. Introduction 
The factual allegations Kelly offered in his post-conviction petition and 
response to the state's motion for summary dismissal in support of his claims 
are either controverted by the record or fail to raise a genuine issue of 
material fact. The district court correctly applied the law in summarily 
dismissing these claims. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On appeal from summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the 
appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material 
fact exists, which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the 
applicant to the requested relief. Matthews v. State, 122 ldaho 801, 807, 839 
P.2d 1215, 1221 (1992); Aeschliman v. State, 132 ldaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 
749, 755 (Ct. App. 1999). Appellate courts freely review whether a genuine 
issue of material fact exists. Edwards v. Conchemco. Inc., 11 1 ldaho 851, 
852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Ct. App. 1986). 
C. General Legal Standards Ap~licable to Post-Conviction Proceedinas 
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a new and independent civil 
proceeding and the petitioner bears the burden of establishing that he is 
entitled to relief. State v. Bearshield, 104 ldaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 
(1983); Hassett v. State, 127 ldaho 313, 315, 900 P.2d 221, 223 (Ct. App. 
1995). However, a petition for post-conviction relief differs from a complaint 
in an ordinary civil action. A petition must contain more than "a short and 
plain statement of the claim" that would suffice for a complaint. Martinez v. 
S&k, 126 ldaho 813, 816, 892 P.2d 488, 491 (Ct. App. 1995) (referencing 
I.R.C.P. 8). The petitioner must submit verified facts within his personal 
knowledge and produce admissible evidence to support his allegations. Id. 
(citing I.C. $ 19-4903). 
A court is not required to accept either the applicant's mere conclusory 
allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's 
conclusions of law. Ferrier v. State, 135 ldaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 
(2001); Roman v. State, 125 ldaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 
1994). 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application 
for post-conviction relief in response to a party's motion or on the court's own 
initiative. Summary dismissal is akin to summary judgment. Hassett, 127 
ldaho at 315, 900 P.2d at 223 (referencing I.R.C.P. 56). A claim for post- 
conviction relief is subject to summary dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906 if 
the applicant "has not presented evidence making a prima facie case as to 
each essential element of the claims upon which the applicant bears the 
burden of proof." Berq v. State, 131 ldaho 517, 518, 960 P.2d 738, 739 
(1 998); Roman, 125 ldaho at 647, 873 P.2d at 901. 
Dismissal is proper where the evidence controverts .an essential 
element of the applicant's claim or does not support relief as a matter of law. 
Cooper v. State, 96 ldaho 542, 545, 531 P.2d 1187, 1190 (1975); Wilson v. 
m, 133 ldaho 874, 878, 993 P.2d 1205, 1209 (Ct. App. 2000). However, if 
an applicant presents a material factual issue, an evidentiary hearing must be 
conducted. Gonzales v. State, 120 ldaho 759, 763, 819 P.2d 1159, 1163 (Ct. 
App. 1991). 
D. Kellv Has Failed To Meet His Burden On Appeal Of Demonstrating 
That The District Court Erred In Summarilv Dismissing His Claims Of 
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel 
To be entitled to relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 
post-conviction petitioner must satisfy the two prong test set forth by the 
United Stdes Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washinaton, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984). The petitioner must demonstrate: 1) that counsel's performance fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness, and 2) that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the 
proceedings would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. 
"[Clounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a 
reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. In any 
ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly 
assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy 
measure of deference to counsel's judgments." State v. Mathews, 133 ldaho 
300, 307, 986 P.2d 323, 330 (1999) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691). 
A reviewing court evaluates counsel's performance at the time of the 
alleged error, not in hindsight, and presumes that "trial counsel was 
competent and that trial tactics were based on sound legal strategy." State v. 
m, 130 ldaho 772, 791-92, 948 P.2d 127, 146-47 (1997). Trial counsel's 
strategic and tactical decisions will not be second-guessed on review or serve 
as a basis for post-conviction relief under a claim of ineffective counsel unless 
the UPCPA petitioner has shown that the decision resulted from inadequate 
preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or other shortcomings capable of 
objective review. Giles v. State, 125 ldaho 921, 924, 877 P.2d 365, 368 
(1994); Cunninnham v. State, 117 ldaho 428, 430-31, 788 P.2d 243, 245-46 
(Ct. App. 1990). "The constitutional requirement for effective assistance of 
counsel is not the key to the prison for a defendant who can dredge up a long 
series of examples of how the case might have been tried better." 
m, 123 ldaho 77,80, 844 P.2d 706,709 (1992). 
Although Strickland typically has been applied to claims of ineffective 
assistance occurring at trial or sentencing, its standards are equally 
applicable to ineffective assistance claims arising out of the plea process. 
See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). 
A defendant must make more than a bare allegation that he "would 
have pleaded differently and gone to trial." Key v. United States, 806 F.2d 
133, 139 (7th Cir. 1986); accord Garaano v. United States, 852 F.2d 886, 891 
(7th Cir. 1988) ("The petitioner has made no showing that there is any 
probability, much less a reasonable one, that the result of any further 
proceeding would be different. He does not suggest that he is not guilty. He 
only suggests that he should have had the opportunity to strike a harder 
bargain with the government. This is not enough to establish prejudice."). 
The "prejudice" requirement focuses on whether counsel's deficient 
performance affected the outcome of the case. m, 474 U.S. at 59. In I-JH, 
the Court stated that "in order to satisv the 'prejudice' requirement, the 
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on 
going to trial." Hill, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. at 370. 
The Court also observed that "the resolution of the 'prejudice' inquiry 
will depend largely on whether the affirmative defense likely would have 
succeeded at trial." & The Court quoted with approval the following 
language from Evans v. Meyer, 742 F.2d 371, 375 (7th Cir.1984): "It is 
inconceivable to us ... that [the defendant] would have gone to trial on a 
defense of intoxication, or that if he had done so he either would have been 
acquitted or, if convicted, would nevertheless have been given a shorter 
sentence than he actually received" (quoted in Hill, 474 U.S. at 59). Thus, 
uses an assessment of the probable result of a trial as a benchmark for 
determining whether the decision to plead would have been different but for 
counsel's errors. Such has long been the rule in ldaho. See Dunla), v. State, 
126 ldaho 901, 905, 894 P.2d 134, 138 (Ct. App. 1995) (prejudice turns upon 
the likelihood that discovery of the defense or exculpatory evidence 
overlooked by counsel would have changed counsel's prediction as to the 
outcome of a trial), review denied; Fox v. State, 125 ldaho 672, 675, 873 P.2d 
926, 929 (Ct. App. 1994); Martinez v. State, 125 ldaho 844, 847, 875 P.2d 
941, 944 (Ct. App. 1994), review denied; Griffith v. State, 121 ldaho 371, 373, 
825 P.2d 94,96 (Ct. App. 1992). 
Here, the district court correctly applied the law when it found that 
Kelly's claims were merely conclusory, self-sewing allegations without 
support in the record. The district court analyzed Kelly's ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims under the Strickland test and found that Kelly 
"failed to prove deficient performance by trial counsel" and that he failed to 
provide evidence other than his own conclusory allegations, that but for his 
attorney's alleged deficient performance he would not have pled guilty. 
(33773 R., pp.73-87.) As to the remainder of Kelly's claims, the district court 
set forth the applicable law and applied it to the various documents filed by 
Kelly in support. The state adopts the district court's opinion on appeal. The 
district court was correct in dismissing Kelly's claims for his failure to provide 
evidence to support them. As such, Kelly failed to meet his burden on appeal 
and the dismissal of his petition should be upheld. 
Has Failed To Establish That His Due Process Rights Were Violated By 
His Absence At A Hearing At Which Nothina Was Araued And Nothing 
Was Determined 
Kelly complains on appeal that his due process rights were violated 
when the district court held the September 27, 2006 hearing on the state's 
motion to dismiss his petition. At the hearing, the State submitted its motion 
on the briefs, and the court took the matter under advisement. Kelly has 
failed to articulate, let alone establish, how his due process rights were 
violated when the district court did not sua sponfe decide to have him 
transported to this hearing. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectFully requests this Court to affirm the district court's 
order summarily dismissing Kelly's post-conviction petition. 
DATED this 18 '~  day of September, 2008. 
Rebekah A. Cude 
- 
Deputy Attorney General 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Gregory Louis Kelly appeals from the district court's summary 
dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. 
Statement of Facts and Course of the Underlying Criminal Proceedinas (S.Ct. 
Docket No. 30586)' 
Kelly was charged with four counts of conspiracy to traffic in 
methamphetamine, one count of trafficking in methamphetamine, one count 
of possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver when children are 
present, and one count of conspiracy to traffic in marijuana. (30586 R., 
pp.125-129.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Kelly pled guilty to two counts of 
conspiracy to traffic in methamphetamine in exchange for the state's 
dismissal of the other five counts. (30586 R., pp.144-152.) The district court 
entered judgment and imposed concurrent unified sentences of twelve years 
with eight years fixed. (30586 R., pp.169-172.) Kelly's Rule 35 motion was 
denied. (30586 R., pp.189-196, 206.) Kelly timely appealed from the 
judgment of conviction and sentence. (30586 R., pp.183-188.) 
On direct appeal, the ldaho Court of Appeals affirmed Kelly's sentence. 
State V. Kelly, 2005 Opinion No. 307 (Ct. App. January 5, 2005) 
(unpublished). The remittitur was issued on January 27, 2005. (Court file, 
S.Ct. No. 30586, Remittitur, dated 1127105.) 
' The state is, contemporaneously with the filing of this brief, filing a motion 
requesting that the ldaho Supreme Court take Judicial Notice of the clerk's 
record and transcripts in Kelly's prior appeal, State v. Kelly, S.Ct. No. 30586. 
1 
Course of Post-Conviction Proceedings (S.Ct. Docket No, 33773) 
Kelly filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction relief (33773 R., 
pp.4-24; attached as Appendix A), as well as an unsigned, unverified 
document entitled "Brief and Affidavit in Support of Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief' (33773 Exhibit). The state filed an answer, asserting as an 
affirmative defense that Kelly's petition was untimely. (33773 R., pp.34-36.) 
Kelly responded by first providing the court with a copy of his notice of appeal 
(33773 R., pp.37-44), and then with a copy of the remittitur issued in his direct 
appeal (33773 R., pp.46-55), establishing that his petition for post-conviction 
for relief was timely filed. 
The state then filed a motion for summary dismissal on the basis that 
Kelly "has no evidentiary basis to support his claims" and "therefore no 
genuine issue of material fact exists." (33773 R., pp.60-61.) The state's 
memorandum in support of its motion more fully laid out the grounds meriting 
summary disposition. (33773 Exhibit; attached as Appendix B.) On August 
30, 2006, the district court scheduled a hearing for September 27, 2006. 
(33773 R., p.2.) On September 25, the district court received Kelly's 
response to the state's motion which consisted of additional argument as well 
as another affidavit. (33773 R., pp.63-68; attached as Appendix C.) 
On September 27, 2006, the district court held the hearing on the 
state's motion for summary dismissal, noting that it had received Kelly's 
written response to the motion but had not received any notice from Kelly that 
he wished to participate. (33773 R., p.69; Tr., p.4, Ls.6-15.) In Kelly's 
absence, the state simply noted that it had outlined the reasons for its motion 
in its brief, and submitted the issue on its briefs. (Tr., p.4, L.24 - p.5, L.8.) 
The district court took notice of the proceedings in the underlying case and 
indicated it would take the matter under advisement. (33773 R., p.69; Tr., 
p.5, L.9-p.6, L.4.) 
Two days after the hearing, the district court received Kelly's motion for 
transport to allow him to be present at the hearing. (33773 R., pp.71-72.) 
The district court thereafter issued its Memorandum Decision and Order, in 
which it granted the state's motion for summary dismissal. (33773 R., pp.73- 
87; attached as Appendix D.) Kelly timely appealed from the district court's 
order. (33773 R., pp.97-102.) 
ISSUES 
Due to their length, the issues enumerated by Kelly are not reproduced 
here, but can be found on pages 4 and 5 of the Appellant's brief. The state 
wishes to rephrase the issues on appeal as: 
'1. Has Kelly failed to establish that he received inadequate notice of the 
grounds for dismissal of his claims? 
2. Has Kelly failed to meet his burden on appeal of demonstrating that the 
district court erred in summarily dismissing his petition? 
3. At the hearing on its motion to dismiss, the state submitted the issue 
on the briefs and presented no additional argument and the court took 
the matter under advisement. Has Kelly failed to demonstrate that his 




Kellv Received Adeauate Notice Of The Grounds For Summarv Dismissal 
A. Introduction 
Kelly claims the district court's order for summary dismissal of his 
petition should be remanded because, he claims, the state's notice did not 
provide adequate notice of the grounds for dismissal or, if it did, the district 
court dismissed his petition on grounds other than those in the state's notice. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.5-13.) Because the state's motion and brief in support of 
its motion gave Kelly adequate notice of the district court's eventual grounds 
for dismissal, Kelly has failed to establish reversible error. 
B. Standards Of Law Governinq Adequacy Of Notice Of The Grounds For 
Summarv Dismissal 
ldaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes a district court to summarily dismiss 
a post-conviction petition upon motion by a party or on the court's own 
initiative. Follinus v. State, 127 ldaho 897, 899, 908 P.2d 590, 592 (Ct. App. 
1995). "When the court considering the petition for post-conviction relief is 
contemplating dismissal sua sponte, it must notify the parties of its intention to 
dismiss and must provide its reasons for the potential dismissal." Banks v. 
State, 123 ldaho 953, 954, 855 P.2d 38, 39 (1993). When the state files a 
motion for summary dismissal, setting forth adequate notice of the grounds 
for dismissal, and the court grants the state's motion for the reasons urged by 
the state, a post-conviction petitioner receives adequate notice of the grounds 
for dismissal. Baruth v. Gardner, I 10  ldaho 156, 159, 715 P.2d 369, 372 (Ct. 
App. 1986). 
Notice is not sufficient if it merely reiterates the language of the 
UPCPA and contends the post-conviction petitioner is not entitled to relief. 
Banks, 123 ldaho at 954, 855 P.2d at 39. Rather, the notice must "identify 
with ... particularity why the district court deemed [petitioner's] evidence or 
legal theories to be deficient." down in^ v. State, 132 ldaho 861, 864, 979 
P.2d 1219, 1222 (Ct. App. 1999). The notice must give the UPCPA petitioner 
a meaningful opportunity to provide further legal authority or evidence that 
may demonstrate the existence of a genuine factual issue. Martinez v. State, 
126 Idaho 813, 818,892 P.2d 488,493 (Ct. App. 1995). 
C. Kellv Received Adeauate Notice Of The Grounds For Summary 
Dismissal 
In its motion for summary dismissal the state set forth the law 
applicable to Kelly's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, due process 
violations, violation of his right against self-incrimination and prosecutorial 
misconduct. (33773 Exhibit, pp.2-4.) The state then dealt with whether 
Kelly's claims met those legal requirements or the requirement that each 
claim be substantiated by admissible, factual allegations. (33773 Exhibit, 
pp.4-7.) As the state correctly asserts throughout, none of Kelly's claims 
meet the requirements for post-conviction relief because his allegations 
afforded him no relief, were refuted by the record of the proceedings in the 
criminal case, or were not supported by any admissible evidence, only 
unsubstantiated conclusory allegations and unsworn statements. (33773 
Exhibit, pp.4-7.) For example, the state pointed out for Kelly that he had 
failed to provide any admissible evidence as to what his desired experts could 
have discovered or would have testified to. (33773 Exhibit, p.5.) The state 
pointed out that the record established that Kelly had, in fact, been given the 
opportunity to review his PSI and that counsel had made corrections to the 
PSI on his behalf. (Id.) The state pointed out that the record established that 
Kelly's plea had been voluntarily and intelligently given, including that he had 
been advised of the consequences of his pleas. (33773 Exhibit, p.6.) 
Much of Kelly's argument on appeal rests on is claim that some of the 
legal conclusions in the state's memorandum are incorrect. Whether every 
ground included in the state's memorandum is beyond argument is not, 
however, the standard. Kelly was given notice of the grounds on which his 
petition was ultimately dismissed. 
Despite Kelly's contrary assertion, the district court dismissed his 
petition upon the same grounds advanced by the state. The district court 
indeed acknowledged the state's reasoning for seeking summary dismissal. 
(33773 R., p.77.) The court agreed with the state and determined that 
because the record affirmatively disproved several of Kelly's allegations 
(including the voluntariness of his plea), several of Kelly's complaints went to 
counsel's trial tactics and strategy, and because Kelly provided no evidence 
in support of his claims beyond conclusory allegations and unsworn 
statements, summary dismissal of his petition was appropriate. (33773 R., 
pp.43.) Although the court apparently also analyzed Kelly's petition under 
additional theories, the court did agree with and dismissed the petition on the 
state's cited grounds in addition to the district court's alternate grounds. As 
such, Kelly had notice of the grounds for summary dismissal of his claims. 
Kelly Has Failed To Meet His Burden On Appeal Of Demonstratinq That The 
District Court Erred In Summarilv Dismissing His Petition 
A. Introduction 
The factual allegations Kelly offered in his post-conviction petition and 
response to the state's motion for summary dismissal in support of his claims 
are either controverted by the record or fail to raise a genuine issue of 
material fact. The district court correctly applied the law in summarily 
dismissing these claims. 
9. Standard Of Review 
On appeal from summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the 
appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material 
fact exists, which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the 
applicant to the requested relief. Matthews v. State, 122 ldaho 801, 807, 839 
P.2d 1215, 1221 (1992); Aeschliman v. State, 132 ldaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 
749, 755 (Ct. App. 1999). Appellate courts freely review whether a genuine 
issue of material fact exists. Edwards v. Conchemco. Inc., 11 1 ldaho 851, 
852,727 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Ct. App. 1986). 
C. General Leqal Standards Applicable to Post-Conviction Proceedinas 
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a new and independent civil 
proceeding and the petitioner bears the burden of establishing that he is 
entitled to relief. State v. Bearshield, 104 ldaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 
(1983); Hassett v. State, 127 ldaho 313, 315, 900 P.2d 221, 223 (Ct. App. 
1995). However, a petition for post-conviction relief differs from a complaint 
in an ordinary civil action. A petition must contain more than "a short and 
plain statement of the claim" that would suffice for a complaint. Martinez v. 
State, 126 ldaho 813, 816, 892 P.2d 488, 491 (Ct. App. 1995) (referencing 
I.R.C.P. 8). The petitioner must submit verified facts within his personal 
knowledge and produce admissible evidence to support his allegations. Id. 
(citing I.C. § 19-4903). 
A court is not required to accept either the applicant's mere conclusory 
allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's 
conclusions of law. Ferrier v. State, 135 ldaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 
(2001); Roman v. State, 125 ldaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 
1994). 
ldaho Code 9 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application 
for post-conviction relief in response to a party's motion or on the court's own 
initiative. Summary dismissal is akin to summary judgment. Hassett, 127 
ldaho at 315, 900 P.2d at 223 (referencing I.R.C.P. 56). A claim for post- 
conviction relief is subject to summary dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906 if 
the applicant "has not presented evidence making a prima facie case as to 
each essential element of the claims upon which the applicant bears the 
burden of proof." Berq v. State, 131 ldaho 517, 518, 960 P.2d 738, 739 
(1998); Roman, 125 ldaho at 647, 873 P.2d at 901 
Dismissal is proper where the evidence controverts an essential 
element of the applicant's claim or does not support relief as a matter of law. 
Cooper v. State, 96 ldaho 542, 545, 531 P.2d 1187, 1190 (1975); Wilson v. 
m, 133 ldaho 874, 878, 993 P.2d 1205,1209 (Ct. App. 2000). However, if 
an applicant presents a material factual issue, an evidentiary hearing must be 
conducted. Gonzales v. State, 120 ldaho 759, 763, 819 P.2d 1159, 1163 (Ct. 
App. 1991). 
D. Kellv Has Failed To Meet His Burden On Appeal Of Demonstrating 
That The District Court Erred In Summarilv Dismissina His Claims Of 
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel 
To be entitled to relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 
post-conviction petitioner must satisfy the two prong test set forth by the 
United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washinqton, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984). The petitioner must demonstrate: 1) that counsel's performance fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness, and 2) that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the 
proceedings would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. 
"[Clounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a 
reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. In any 
ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly 
assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy 
measure of deference to counsel's judgments." State v. Mathews, 133 ldaho 
300, 307, 986 P.2d 323, 330 (1999) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691). 
A reviewing court evaluates counsel's performance at the time of the 
alleged error, not in hindsight, and presumes that "trial counsel was 
competent and that trial tactics were based on sound legal strategy." State v. 
m, 130 ldaho 772, 791-92, 948 P.2d 127, 146-47 (1997). Trial counsel's 
strategic and tactical decisions will not be second-guessed on review or serve 
as a basis for post-conviction relief under a claim of ineffective counsel unless 
the UPCPA petitioner has shown that the decision resulted from inadequate 
preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or other shortcomings capable of 
objective review. Giles v. State, 125 ldaho 921, 924, 877 P.2d 365, 368 
(1994); Cunninaham v. State, 117 ldaho 428, 430-31, 788 P.2d 243, 245-46 
(Ct. App. 1990). "The constitutional requirement for effective assistance of 
counsel is not the key to the prison for a defendant who can dredge up a long 
series of examples of how the case might have been tried better." lvev v. 
State, 123 ldaho 77,80, 844 P.2d 706,709 (1992). 
Although Strickland typically has been applied to claims of ineffective 
assistance occurring at trial or sentencing, its standards are equally 
applicable to ineffective assistance claims arising out of the plea process. 
See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). 
A defendant must make more than a bare allegation that he "would 
have pleaded differently and gone to trial." Key v. United States, 806 F.2d 
133, 139 (7th Cir. 1986); accord Garqano v. United States, 852 F.2d 886, 891 
(7th Cir. 1988) ("The petitioner has made no showing that there is any 
probability, much less a reasonable one, that the result of any further 
proceeding would be different. He does not suggest that he is not guilty. He 
only suggests that he should have had the opportunity to strike a harder 
bargain with the government. This is not enough to establish prejudice."). 
The "prejudice" requirement focuses on whether counsel's deficient 
performance affected the outcome of the case. Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. In HiJl, 
the Court stated that "in order to satisfy the 'prejudice' requirement, the 
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on 
going to trial." klill, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. at 370. 
The Court also observed that "the resolution of the 'prejudice' inquiry 
will depend largely on whether the affirmative defense likely would have 
succeeded at trial." Id. The Court quoted with approval the following 
language from Evans v. Mever, 742 F.2d 371, 375 (7th Cir.1984): "It is 
inconceivable to us ... that [the defendant] would have gone to trial on a 
defense of intoxication, or that if he had done so he either would have been 
acquitted or, if convicted, would nevertheless have been given a shorter 
sentence than he actually received" (quoted in Hill, 474 U.S. at 59). Thus, 
uses an assessment of the probable result of a trial as a benchmark for 
determining whether the decision to plead would have been different but for 
counsel's errors. Such has long been the rule in Idaho. See Dunlap v. State, 
126 ldaho 901, 905, 894 P.2d 134, 138 (Ct. App. 1995) (prejudice turns upon 
the likelihood that discovery of the defense or exculpatory evidence 
overlooked by counsel would have changed counsel's prediction as to the 
outcome of a trial), review denied; Fox v. State, 125 ldaho 672, 675, 873 P.2d 
926, 929 (Ct. App. 1994); Martinez v. State, 125 ldaho 844, 847, 875 P.2d 
941, 944 (Ct. App. 1994), review denied; Griffith v. State, 121 ldaho 371, 373, 
825 P.2d 94, 96 (Ct. App. 1992). 
Here, the district court correctly applied the law when it found that 
Kelly's claims were merely conclusory, self-serving allegations without 
support in the record. The district court analyzed Kelly's ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims under the Strickland test and found that Kelly 
"failed to prove deficient performance by trial counsel" and that he failed to 
provide evidence other than his own conclusory allegations, that but for his 
attorney's alleged deficient performance he would not have pled guilty. 
(33773 R., pp.73-87.) As to the remainder of Kelly's claims, the district court 
set forth the applicable law and applied it to the various documents filed by 
Kelly in support. The state adopts the district court's opinion on appeal. The 
district court was correct in dismissing Kelly's claims for his failure to provide 
evidence to support them. As such, Kelly failed to meet his burden on appeal 
and the dismissal of his petition should be upheld. 
Kelly Has Failed To Establish That His Due Process Rights Were Violated By 
His Absence At A Hearing At Which Nothina Was Argued And Nothinq 
Was Determined 
Kelly complains on appeal that his due process rights were violated 
when the district court held the September 27, 2006 hearing on the state's 
motion to dismiss his petition. At the hearing, the State submitted its motion 
on the briefs, and the court took the matter under advisement. Kelly has 
failed to articulate, let alone establish, how his due process rights were 
violated when the district court did not sua sponfe decide to have him 
transported to this hearing. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's 
order summarily dismissing Kelly's post-conviction petition. 
DATED this 18 '~  day of September, 2008 
- 
Deputy Attorney General 
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APPENDIX A 
Inmate N a r n e ~ - m ~ z s  KELLY ?fl!lc 
IDOCNo. 71 661 
Address CCA/PRAIRIE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY '- 9 4/Y 10: , <) 
- - 
P.O. BOX 50.0 DA-202 
APPLETON, PrINNESOTA 56288 
Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICLAL DISTRICT 
OF TJ3E STATE OF IDAHO, 0\3 AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOWIS'EVIGLE 
< 
-Ly > 1 
1 CaseNo. C v ' . . D h - l I q  
Petitioner, 1 
1 PETITION AND AFFIDAVIT 
vs. ) FOR POST CONVICTION 
1 ICELIEF 
STATE OF IDAHO > 1 
1 
Respondent. ) 
The Petitioner alleges: 
1. Place of detention if in custody: CCA/PRAIRIE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY 
2. Name and location of the Court which imposed judgementlsentence: SEVENTH 
JUDICIAL DISTRIGT CO-q. TDAHO 
3. The case number and the offense or offenses for which sentence was imposed: 
(a) Case Number: CR-0 2 - 2 3 6 2 8 
(b) Offense Convicted: TWO COUNTS CONSPIRACY TO TRAFFIC 'YEZfWWmm 
4. The date upon which sentence was imposed and the terms of sentence: 
a. Date of Sentence: DBF:R ZD t h  ?OD 7 
b. Terns ofsentence: COUNTS I S g & I E  8 YEARS DETERMNATE, 12 
YEARS INDETERMNATE FOR TOTAL OF 20 TO RUN CONCURRENTLY 
PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF - 1 
Revised: 10113105 
9. If your application is based upon the failure of counsel to adequately represent you, 
state concisely and in detail what counsel failed to do in representing your interests: 
-- 
10. Are you seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis, that is, requesting the 
proceeding be at county expense? (If your answer is "yes", you nlust fill out a 
Motion to Proceed in Fomla Pauperis and supporting affidavit.) 
Yes [ I N 0  
1 1. Are you requesting the appointment of counsel to represent you in this case? (If your 
a~lswer is "yes", you must fill out a Motion for the Appointment of Counsel and supporting 
affidavit, as well as a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and supporting affidavit.) 
[ 1 Yes [xl No 
12. State specifically the relief you seek: 
T O  VACATE S E N T E N C E  I M P O S E D  UNDER,  T H E  F I F T H .  S T X T H  AND 
F O ~ T R T E E & T ~ ~ T W N A ' P I E F  TH'15 H13l- 
COURT DEEMS A- 
PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF - 3 
Revised: 10/13/05 
13. This Petition may be accompanied by affidavits in support ofthe petition. (Forms 
for this are available.) 
DATED this ,&& day of ~ec-cinl\ac$ ,20&. 
STATE OF rnacl,=~{ ) 
1 ss 
County of F t  1 
Gm, \<C,\\+ , being sworn, deposes and says that the party is the 
Petitioner in the above-entitled appeal and that all statements in this PETITION FOR POST 
CONVICTION RELIEF are true and correct to the best of his or her knowledge and belief. 
SUBSCRLBED AND SWORN and AFFIRMED to before me this a day of 
PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF - 4 
Revised: IO/i3/05 
AFFIDAVIT OF FACTS IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION PETITION ?0::': j ? , !  
- 9  4 f f  /o: , 
STATE OF IDAHO 1 
1 ss 
COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 1 
kPe-fiLI 1 a \ht\\q , bang first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says 
I I ., 
( 1  LTEIF ~ E T T T T ~  OF 
, 
( 2 ) THE PETITIONER' GBS NOT ON"-THE..LEBSE :OFITHE PROPERTY .TO W'HECH THE 
SEARCH WARRANT WAS ISSUED. 
( 3 )  - - ~ I J ~ ~ I J x $ F . O F  COMPLEX. 
( 4 )  MERE P R E S E N C E D O E S N O T ~ T  I N THE CRIME- 
( 5 1 -= 08 - w n r  - ON PETTTT-R 
( 6 )  PETTTT- 
( 7 )  ALL THE STATE STT- fiT P R E V  A lVLoTTVE 
F D R T E S T r F Y I N G - T H E P F T I T r D N R R  
( 8 ) N- 3 
( 9 gY 
( 1 0 J s ~ f i T e  W T T W  dhT .SElWEN~TI\T~ TFSTT- nF PET'TT0NL 
( 1 1J PRTTTTONFR W A S  m e n  TNTom GT1TT4Ty 
4 1 2 )  ~FTT'PTONV- -S EACH ON TWO COUNTS TO 
RTlN r-TT.V. 
( I 3 )PETITIONER ILL 
(14)PETITIONER APPEALED RULE 35 
AFFIDAVIT OF FACTS IN SUPPORT OF POST CONVICTION PETITION - 1 
Revised: 10113/05 
ISSUESPRESENTED ON POST' CONVICTION RELIEF 
( 1 )  THE WITNESSES WERE TOLD TO POINT THE FINGER AT THE PETITIONER. 
. .. 
( 2 )  A WITNESS WAS TOLD IFSE DIDN'T LIESHE WOULD DO ALL THE TIME. 
( 3 )  THE PROSECUTIONS WITNESSES TESTIFIED AGAINST THE PETITIONER 
IN ORDER TO HAVE CHARGES DROPPED OR REDUCED. 
(4) THERE WAS CONFLICTING STATEMENTS BETWEEN WITNESSES. 
, 
(5) THERE WAS CONFLICTING STATEMENTS BY A WITNESS. 
( 6 )  EXTENCEVETESTIMONE OF PETITIONER'S UNINVOLVEMENT OF CRIME. 
( 7 )  DEFENENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO IMPEACH TESTIMONY OF WITNESS WITH 
CONFLICTING TESTIMONY. 
(8) DID NOT RECEIVE COPY OF SEARCH WARRENT TO SEE IF WARRENT IN- 
CLUDED NEIGHBORING FIELD AND DID NOT RECEIVE PHOTZ~S.AN/> THPfJ. 
( 9 )  TRIAL CONSEL FAILED TO SECURE EXPERT ON DRUG USE. 
(10) TRIAL COUNSEL FAILED TO OBTAIN INDEPENDENT FINGER PRINT EXPERT. 
(11) TRIAL COUNSEL FAILED TO SECURE EXPERT ON VOICE/ TAPE EXPERT. 
(12) COUNSEL FAILED TO PURSUE ISSUE OF MISTAKEN INDENTGTE.' 
.(I~).PETITIONER WAS'MER$LY PRESENT AT THE RESIDENCE WHILE WARRENT 
i WAS SERVED. 
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Respondent, State of Idaho, by and through the Bonneville Cou~lty Prosecuting 
Attorney's Office, herby submits its memorandum in support of its motion for summary 
dismissal of Petitioner's post-conviction relief petition. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Petitioner filed his petition in January 2006. Petitioner makes numerous and various 
allegations involving the underlying case, CR-02-23628. In the underlying case, petitioner, 
pursuant to a written plea agreement, pled guilty to Count 11, Conspiracy to Traffick 
Methamphetamine I.C. $$ 37-2732B(a)(4)(A), 37-2732B(b) and Count I11 Conspiracy to 
Traffick Methamphetamine I.C. $8 37-2732B(a)(4)(A), 37-2732B(b) as outlined in the Third 
Amended Information.. The Change of plea hearing took place on August 20, 2003 and 
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supporting its allegations. Snzall v. State, 132 Idaho 327, 331, 971 P.2d 1151, 1155 {Ct. App. 
To prove an ineffective assistance of counsel allegation, the petitioner must 
prove each prong of a two prong test. The first prong is that the performance of counsel was 
deficient and the second prong is that the deficiency was prejudicial to petitioner. In Jones v. 
State, 125 Idaho 294,297,870 P.2d 1 (Ct. App. 1994), the Idaho Court of Appeals discussed 
the proof required for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and the Strickland test as 
In order to prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an applicant must 
show that the attorney's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.  668, 104 S. Ct, 2052,80 L.E. 2d 674 (1984); 
Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758,760,760 P. 2d. 1174, 1176 (1988). There is a strong 
presulnption that trial counsel's performance falls within the wide range of 
'professional assistance'. Id. An applicant must not only show incompetence, but must 
also show that the deficient conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the 
adversarial process that the trial court cannot be reiied upon as having produced a just 
result. Ivey v. State, 123 Idaho 77,80 844 P.2d 706,709 (1992). In Strickland, supra, 
the United States Supreme Court advanced a two-part test to determine whether a claim 
of ineffective assistance could prevail. A defendant must demonstrate not only that trial 
counsel was deficient, but also that the deficiency led to some prejudice. 
Jones v. State, 125 Idaho at 296, 870 P.2d at 3. 
The petitioner has the burden of identifying the acts or omissions of counsel that were 
not the result of reasonable professional judgment. State v. Chapman, 120 Idaho 466,8 16 P.2d 
1023 (Ct. App. 1991). 
Defense counsel's choice of witnesses, manner of cross examination, and lack of 
objection to allegedly damaging evidence falls within the purview of "trial tactics" or "strategy 
choices" that are in the exclusive domain of trial counsel. Id. at p.469 to 470. 
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2. Issues dealing with trial counsel not obtaining experts and failure to investigate. 
There is no genuine issue of fact raised regarding the allegations that trial counsel did 
not obtain experts and failed to investigate. Again, at the change of plea hearing, Tr. pp. 20-26, 
petitioner freely stated facts that made him guilty of the crimes to which he pled guilty. 
Petitioner fails to provide any admissible evidence as to what the experts could have 
and would have testified or what investigation that was allegedly not performed would have 
revealed. See Small v. State, 132 Idaho 327, 331, 971 P.2d 1151, 1155 (Ct. App. 1999). In 
other words, petitioner cannot meet the two- prong test of Strickland. Assuming petitioner can 
establish deficient performance of counsel (state's position is that petitioner cannot), he 
certainly cannot show prejudice. Petitioner fully and clearly admitted facts to support his 
finding of guilt. 
Furthermore, counsel's decision to not obtain experts or failure to investigate would be 
considered "trial tactics" or "strategy choices" and therefore not subject to attack on post 
conviction proceedings. Therefore, summary dismissal or summary adjudication of all issues 
dealing with the preliminary hearing should be summarily dismissed. 
3. Issues relating to PSI. 
At the outset, any issues dealing with the PSI would only entitle petitioner to relief in 
the form of re-sentencing. Nevertheless, there is no error on the part of trial counsel concerning 
the PSI. Pursuant to the Sentencing transcript, petitioner had the opportunity to review the PSI 
with his attorney, Tr. p.29. Corrections to the PSI were made. Tr. pp. 29-30. Petitioner also 
complains that he should have been Mirandized for the interview. Petitioner, at the time of his 
guilty plea, was well aware that he was waiving his privilege against self incrimination by 
pleading guilty. Tr. p.20. 
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Therefore, petitioner raises no genuine issue of material fact concerning his 
allegations pertaining to his guilty plea and summary dismissal or summary adjudication of 
issues should be granted thereon. 
5. Issue pertaining to failure to file notice of appeal. 
Petitioner claims that his counsel failed to file a notice of appeal. This 
allegation, even if true, is immaterial in light of the fact that an appeal was filed and an 
unpublished opinion was rendered by the Idaho Court of Appeals on January 5,2005, a copy of 
which is attached as hereto. Therefore, petitioner raises no genuine issue of material fact 
concerning his allegations pertaining to failure to file notice of appeal and summary dismissal 
or summary adjudication of issues should be granted thereon. 
CONCLUSION 
Therefore, it is respectfully requested that respondent's motion for summary 
disposition, alternatively summary adjudication of issues, be granted. 
DATED this JC/ day of August 2006. 
Dan Bevilacqua 
Deputy Prosecuting Atto y 
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I certify that I mailed, with postage prepaid, or caused to be hand-delivered a true 
and correct copy of the following document to be served on the following persons this. .. , 
day of August 2006. % .  , I . , . '  '< . .  , 
DOCUMENT: Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Sum~nary Dismissal 
PARTIES SERVED: Gregory Louis Kelly 
1171661-ID 
Bill Clayton Detention Center 
2600 South Sunset 
Littiefield, TX 79339 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAI-IO, 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Case No. CV-06-114 
REPLY TO STATES A4OTION 
FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL 
COMES NOW, GREGORY L. KELLY, wit11 this reply to the States Motion For Summaly 
Dismissal. 111 ai~swering to paragraph (1) issues dealing wit11 testimoi~y at the prelii~~inar)~ 
hearing, look at the prelin~i~~ary hearing Feb. 28, 2003 of Stala Bo~son testifies for the 
prosecutioil on pages 9,10,ll ,md 19. David Claibor~le testified on pages 32,33 ,and 15. 
Ms. Taylor testifies oil pages 87,88, Micheal Harris prelinlinary minutes, Ms. Taylor's answer 
on page 38. 
When the prosecutor on pg.25, L. 5-8 recounts Stephanie Taylol.'~ testinloily she had 
know the defeildant since she was 16, on pg.55 L. 22 of preliiniilary mii~utes he actually stated 
she luew the defei~da~t wl>en she was 14. At the time that she was 14 tile defendant was in the 
Colorado State Priso11, she could i~o t  have known him. Witness ta~llperiilg, see affadavit 101x1 
Pirce,also piivate iilvestigator worltillg on affidavits for Lacy Scouted, Jerellly Plwlic, Heather 
C L I N I ~ I I ~ ~ I ~ I I ,  Milce Icelit, Brad Kelly, Ron Kelly, Eric Hiilliley, Tailgee ICelly, also see 
defenda~t affidavit. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on t 
Mailed a true and correct copy of the 
prison illail systezu for proces 
That tile following illfonllatioll is based upon ill~l penonal kilo~vledge as follows: 
Sometune in 2004 D.E.A. Special Agent Clxis I-Tughs of Boise, Idallo, Joe h4oussiau and 
Clris Yalloll of Los Angeles D.E.A. set LIP an iilterview with ine about other illvestigation after 
that conversation we talked about nly case. At that tilne S.A. Hughs ask lne why didn't I ask to 
speaic with illem as I stated to him I had 110 legal cou~lsel at that time they were released by Judge 
or, just no legal coullsel at that time. He stated that had I spoke wit11 tllem I would not be loclted 
up. Everytlriilg tiley had on iilvestigation was on Finis White. We also talked about the change 
for Sept. 13, 2002 of my, self and Milce Harris. I-Te said oil the stand and to my self he never seen 
who was on the bike I ask if the i l i fo r~ l~a~~t  Dave CIaiborne was wired he said no. But the car 
was wired with a clear tape. That would have Ray Willia~lls voice as I told lily attorney & 
Stuck that tape was never given to me or played for me. 1 ask illy legal counsel for that tape and 
Balk Stateillellts or video from Ba~~lc  of America oil first St. l-le ask \vhy, 1 told hi111 it would 
show that Ray Williams was in Idaho and deposit the lnolley kom that drug transaction ill, the 
bani< and illat everyone had poillted out Mike Harris, on the bike that day, comulitted perjury the 
tape does have Ray Willialls voice and on Oct. 16, 2002 it llad Ray Williams telling the 
illforlllailt Dave Claibon~e where to go. Also sonle time in 2003 Heather Cunningham was 
visiting anotiler ilul~ate at Bomeville, County jail while Ron and Brad ICelly was visiting me and 
told me Fillis White told her to point the finger at me. I ~vo~ild never get out and tiley would get 
110 time if they said they got their drugs and iuoiley fro111 ille witch they did not. 1 also aslc for 
fingeiyri~~ts for a potato chip bag they foiuld about 25 feet fro111 the ko~l t  door of tile apt. In court 
tiley said I had no gloves on it have to have Finger prints it would show who the prints we]-e 011 
the bags and not lnille Stephine Taylor and Ray Willialns said 1 was sleep even at tiine of arrest 
1 was asleep. 1 had 110 la~owledge of what Finis White and l ia)~ Williams \yere doing oil 
Novelnber 17111, 2002, oil the day I was charged with. Ray Williams and Finis White were not 
working for lne or with ille at that time. Also aroru~d the luiddle of Novetllber I saw 
WinMey and Jerenly Planlc at l.S.C.I. at different times because of how we were housed and 
tlley both told lne Detective I(ii11 Marshall told them if they just say they got all their drugs and 
illoiley fro111 ine they would get all charges dropped, that I wrote ill tixis affidavit is 100% [rue 
 hat I was told, and what I know for facts. 1 also had asked for legal cou~lsel to do m)r direct 
appeal in person and by phone and Ile refused to do as I ask. Also illy legal couilsel M a n  Stuclci 
said if I don't take the state deal he would withdraw, and he did. Judge Anderson had him stay 
on. Wllicll was a conflict of ilrterest. He also told ille if I don't sign the plea agreement that I 
would have to go to Vial on 111y own or find new coui~sei n two days and the jurors \vould hang 
illy black ass. Lacy Scouten also told me ICim Marshall and Michelle Mallard told her to sap. 
that the dixtgs she had, had collie from me. She also said the drugs, she had came from Finis 
White, wit11 Ilis fingerprints on all the bags. Also Stephine Taylor said she was at the apa~t~tmeilt 
and saw Micl~eal Harris oil the bike first. She was at work and calne llome she was fired at least 
three months prior from Soutllwind CollvaIescellt in Idaho Falls, Idaho. Mrs. Carol Dodge also 
doing an affidavit, over heard Michele Mallard tlxeading Lacy Scouten in phone conversation 
with Stephine Taylor and both 1Ci111 Marshal and Michel Mallard told her if she did not lie, they 
would give her ten years. 
All that I have written in this affidavit is 100% true. 1 tried to get the recordiilg from I.C.C. of 
Lacy Scouten. Its there for verification of what l've said and Clinton Bay and Associates I-lired a 
private iilvestigator getting lllore affidavits at this time fro111 Lacy Scoutell, Milie Kent. Heather 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
L PROCEDURE 
In case CR-02-23628 Gregory Louis Kelly ("Kelly") entered into a plea bargain with the 
State whereby he would plead guilty to Counts I1 and 111, Conspimcy to Traffick 
Methamphetamine under Idaho Code $3 37-2732B(a)(4)(A), 37-2732B(b) as outlined in the third 
amended information, in exchange for the State to dismiss Counts I, IV, V, VI, and VIL Kelly 
entered his guilty plea in a hearing on August 20, 2003. A transcript of the hearing was provided 
for this case. On October 20, 2003, Judge Gregory Anderson sentenced Kelly to twenty years 
confinement on Count 11 (eight years minimum, twelve years indeterminate) and the same on 
Count 111, to be served concurrently. A judgment of cot~viction was entered on October 22,2003, 
which was subsequently amended on October 24, 2003. Subsequently, Kelly filed a Rule 35 
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GREGORY L. KELLY, 
Petitioner, 
VS. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
Case No. CV-06-114 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
921, 828 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Ct.App.1992). Summary dismissal of an application 
pursuant to I.C. 3 19-4906 is the procedural equivalent of s m a r y  judgment under 
I.R.C.P. 56. Like a plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant must prove by a 
preponderance of evidence the allegations upon which the request for post-conviction 
relief is based. I.C. § 19-4907; Russell v. State, 11 8 Idaho 65,67,794 P.2d 654,656 
(Ct.App. 1990). Ail application for post-conviction relief differs fiom a complaint in 
an ordinary civil action, however, for an applicatioil must co~ltain much more than "a 
short and plain statement of the claim" that would suffice for a complaint under 
I R C P  ( a ) ( ) .  Rather, an application for post-conviction relief must be verified 
with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant, and affidavits, 
records or other evidence supporting its allegations must be attached, or the 
application must state why such supporting evidence is not included with the 
application. I.C. 5 19-4903. In other words, the application must present or be 
accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or the application 
will be subject to dis~nissal. 
Idaho Code Section 19-4906 authorizes summary disposition of an 
application for post-conviction relief, either pursuant to motioil of a party or upon the 
cout's ow11 initiative. Summary dismissal is permissible only when the applicant's 
evidence has raised no genuine issue of material fact which, if resolved in the 
applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the requested relief. If such a factual 
issue is presented, an evidentiary heaxing must be conducted. Gonzales v. State, 120 
Idaho759,763,819P,2d 1159,1163 (Ct.App.1991); Hooverv. State, 114Idaho 145, 
146,754 P.2d458,459 (Ct.App.1988); Ramirez v. State, 113 Idaho 87,89,741 P.2d 
374, 376 (Ct.App. 1987). Summary dismissal of an application for post-conviction 
relief may be appropriate, however, even where the state does not controvert the 
applicant's evidence because the court is not required to accept either the applicant's 
mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's 
conclusions of law. Rornan v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 
(Ct.App.1994); Baruth v. Gardeer, 110 Idaho 156, 159, 715 P.2d 369, 372 
(Ct.App.1986). 
State v. LePage, 138 Idaho 803,806-07,69 P.3d 1064,1067-68 (Ct.App. 2003). 
In order to prevail in a post-conviction proceeding, the applicant must prove the 
allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. I.C. 5 19-4907; Stuart v. State, I I8 Idaho 865, 
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought under the post- 
conviction procedure act. Murray v. State, I21 Idaho 918, 924-25,828 P.2d 1323, 1329-30 
(Ct.App.1992). To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must 
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advise Kelly of all ramifications of guilty plea, investigate alibi defense, file pre-trial nlotio~ls to 
suppress, and file notice of appeal. 
The State argues that summary dismissal is appropriate under I. C. 5 19-4906(c) because 
the affidavits and other documents filed by Kelly do not contain any admissible facts to establish 
his claims including his claim of ineffective assistance of defense counsel. The State further 
argues that his counsel, Manr Stuclti ("Stuck?'), made several strategic decisions with consent of 
Kelly during the preliminary hearing which cannot be second guessed in a post conviction relief 
proceeding. 
Kelly bears the burden of demonstrating that his trial counsel was ineffective. In Milburn 
v. State, 135 Idaho 701,23 P.3d 775 (Ct.App. 2000), the Idaho Court of Appeals stated: 
To prevail on a claim for ineffective assistance, an applica~lt must sllow 
that the defense attorney's representation was deficient and that the deficiency was 
prejudicial. Strickland v. Fashington, 466 U.S. 668,687, 104 S.Ct. 2052,2064, 
80 L.Ed.2d 674,693 (1984); State v. Roles, 122 Idaho 138, 144, 832 P.2d 31 1, 
3 17 (Ct.App.1992). In order to meet the deficient perfonnance prong of this test, 
an applicant must demonstrate that the attorney's conduct fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness. Strickland, at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 
at 693; Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758,760,760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). A 
demonstration of deficient performance requires that the applicant's evidence 
overcome a strong presumption that trial counsel's performance fell within the 
wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Id.; State v. Leavitt, 116 Idaho 
285,291, 775 P.2d 599, 605 (1989); Estes v. State, 111 Idaho 430,433-34,725 
P.2d 135, 138-39 (1986). In evaluating an attorney's performance a court must 
endeavor "to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the 
circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from 
counsel's perspective at the time." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, 
80 L.Ed.2d at 694. 
To satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, the applicant must 
establish that there is a reasonable probability that, absent counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the outcome of the trial would have been different. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2067, 80 L.Ed.2d at 697; Aragon, 114 
Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177. That is, the applicant must show that the 
attorney's deficient conduct "so undermined the proper functioning of the 
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just 
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not entitled to the warning because he did not claim the Fifth Amendment privilege and he did 
not fall under the two exceptions). 
Kelly further claims that Stuclci gave ineffective assistance of counsel by threatening to 
withdraw if Kelly did not accept the State's plea bargain and failed to advise him of all of the 
ramifications of a guilty plea Threats of withdrawal are insufficient for ineffective assistance 
ctaiins where the defendant accepts a plea bargain and clearing aclcnowledges that he was not 
coerced into the plea bargain. See Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 576,976 P.2d 927,930 
(1999). In this case, Kelly fails to provide a transcript or other evidence that shows he attempted 
to show coercion or taint of his guilty plea. 
According to the audio recording of Kelly's change of plea hearing on August 20,2003, 
the following exchange took place between Judge Anderson and Kelly: 
Judge Anderson: An information . . . charges you with at least seven counts 
including trafficking of methamphetamine . . . possession 
of metl~amphetamine. . . . As I understand it, you [Kelly] 
have agreed to plead guilty to counts two and three. . . . Is 
that correct? 
Kelly: Yes. 
. . . 
Judge Anderson: Let me go over again the plea agreement. Did you review 
the terms of the plea agreement? . . . The plea agreement 
goes over all seven charges and then the State agrees to 
dismiss charges one and four through seven in exchange for 
your guilty plea on counts two and three. 
. . .  
Judge Anderson: Is there anything that was overlooked that was not included 
in this agreement? 
Kelly: No. 
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basis of inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of 
objective evaluation. See Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 775 P.2d 1243 (Ct.App.1989). Kelly 
has not provided specific facts lo show that Stucki's behavior fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable representation. Therefore, without any objective evidence in the record, such as an 
affidavit by another defense attorney, it would strain reason to see how Stucki provided 
ineffective assistance of counsel on these grounds based solely on Kelly's statements. 
Kelly argues that his claims for relief are distinguishable from Snzall v Slate, 132 Idaho 
327, 971 P.2d 1151 (Ct.App. 1999) on which the State relies for summary disn~issal. InSmall, 
Small was charged and convicted of murder in the first degree, conspiracy to commit ~nurder, 
robbery and conspiracy to comnit robbery even though she was not present at the murder. Snzall, 
132 Idaho at 329, 97 1 P.2d at 11 53. Small filed for post-conviction relief based on an &davit 
of her accomplice who testified at trial and then changed his story regarding SmalI's involvement 
in the crime after Small was convicted. Id., 132 Idaho at 330,971 P.2d at 1154. The district 
court determined that Small's application should be summarily dismissed because the evidence 
was merely cumulative of other evidence presented at trial and because the evidence presented 
would not probably produce a n  acquittal. Id., 132 Idaho at 333,971 P.2d at 1157. The cow? of 
appeals affirmed suinmary dismissal since Small's additional evidence failed the third element of 
Drapeau. Id. 132 Idaho at 336,971 P.2d at 1 160 (citing to State v Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685,551 
P.2d 972 (1976)). 
Under Drapeau, a motion based on newly discovered evidence must disclose (I) that the 
evidence is newly discovered and was unknown to the defendant at time of trial; (2) that the 
evidence is material, not merely cumulative or impeaching; (3) that it will probably produce an 
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Methamphetamine," but cites to Idaho Code Ej 37-2732B(a)(3)(A) instead of Idaho Code $37- 
2732B(a)(4)(A) as properly indicated in Kelly's pIea agreement, the information and the 
sentencing transcript. Again, there is no evidence that Judge Anderson was confused as to this 
incorrect citation or improperly sentenced ICelly. Therefore, this Court finds that Kelly was not 
denied his due process rights because of this typographical inconsistency and the State's motion 
should be granted. 
3. DENIED RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION AND RIGHT TO A TRIAL 
Kelly argues that he was denied his right against self-incrimination and a right to a trial. 
However, Kelly gave up these rights when he chose to plead guilty. State v. Murphy, 125 Idaho 
456-57, 872 P.2d 719-20 (1 994). Therefore, Kelly's claim on these grounds are baseless and 
must be denied. 
4. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
Kelly argues that prosecutorial misconduct was committed when "four witnesses received 
special blea] bargains" from the State in exchange for giving false testimony against him. Kelly 
also argues that the prosecutors gave him fdse information and withheld other potentially 
exculpatory information. Kelly argues that under such circumstances he was coerced into 
pleading guilty and that such circumstances provide the basis for a re-sentencing based on United 
States v. Cohen, 171 F.3d 796 (3rd Cir. 1999). However, Kelly's petition and accompanying 
documents do not provide any admissible facts to support his argument. For example, there is no 
affidavit from any of these witnesses or co-conspirators stating that false testimony was given. 
In Coheiz, the defendant pleaded guilty to some of the charges against him (the charges 
related to tax evasion) while going to trial on others. Id. at 806. The Cohen Court stated that his 
situation was extremely unusual and granted a re-sentencing because the trial court mis- 
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In Sirnons, the defendant dragged her boyfriend to death after his hand was caught in the 
car's window as she was fleeing from him to her parent's house. State v. Simons, 112 Idaho 254, 
255,731 P.2d 797, 798 (Ct. App. 1987). A jail matron, an employee of the State, who booked 
Simons into jail following her arrest had knowledge that Sunons was severely disoriented and 
had fresh injuries. Id. 112 Idaho at 257,73 1 P.2d 800. Even though this information would have 
provided a strong defense to the criminal charge, the court found that this infomlation withheld 
by the State did not substantially hamper Simons and her counsel in the plea bargaining process. 
Id. 112 Idaho at 259,73 1 P.2d 802. The Simons' Court upheld her sentence on appeal. Id. 112 
Idaho at 261,73 1 P.2d 804. 
In the present case, even if Kelly could have stated what admissible exculpatory 
information was withheld by the State, according to Si~izons, this information likely would not 
have been sufficient to overcome Kelly's knowing and voluntary guilty plea and subsequent 
sentencing. A plea of guilty has the same force and effect as a judgment rendered after a full trial 
on the merits. Lockard v. State, 92 Idaho 813,451 P.2d 1014 (1969). Like the verdict of a jury it 
is conclusive as to the facts. The court is left with "nothing to do but give judgment and 
sentence." Id. at 818,451 P.2d at 1019, quoting Kel-cheval v. UnitedStates, 274 U.S. 220,47 
S.Ct. 582,71 L.Ed. 1009 (1927). 
In short, this Court finds that there was no prosecutorial misconduct and that the plea 
bargaining process was not unfairly biased against Kelly. Therefore, Kelly'sargmnent for relief 
on the ground of prosecutorial misconduct is unpersuasive and the State's motion should be 
granted. 
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